ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
There are several challenges facing the e-mail systems; for example, the increase of harmful techniques has forced e-mail users to search for the higher degree of safety and privacy to ensure the security of the transmitted information [1] . This is due to the recent spread of viruses, hackers, malwares, worms, and Botnets.
Spam is one of these challenges that abuse the electronic messaging system by sending a huge amount of unrequested bulk messages randomly that makes up of 80% of the emails as a spam [2] . The reason behind this high percentage is due to the armies of the harmful bots that are controlled by a bot master. Botnets refer to a group of software called 'bots' or 'robots'. The function of these bots is to run on several computers autonomously and automatically [3] . This kind of software usually works at the end-user system that has been infected. Once these bots are installed, they send an identification message to the bot master. The bot master can start any command and control session by using these infected computers that are called 'zombies'. The bot master performs illegal attacks on all these zombies. Bots work under the shadow to avoid being detected by an antivirus or observed by the user. Bots software has the ability to disable the antivirus effect by producing an anti antivirus [2] . The best time for the bots to start performing their activities is during the idle period of the host computer. This happens especially when the bots sense the low CPU utilization; hence they start to take advantage of the infected host resources to do their desired activities.
Botnet and SPAM Activity
The Botnet's strength comes from the number of zombies that can be controlled. "Bots" act in a similar way as worms in their propagation attempts between the computers in a network. The increasing number of zombie machines strengthens the Botnet capabilities. A computer may receive unwanted e-mails which usually contain commercial materials, adult materials and website advertisements that might be attached with harmful software like malware, viruses, and bots. This software is used to propagate between networked computers by performing discrete or multiple actions such as spamming [3] .
The current techniques of the antivirus/anti-spam can detect spam by screening the content of e-mails which are widely used nowadays to mitigate spam e-mails [4] .
EXISTING WORK ON SPAM DETECTION
At present, there are many proposed and developed software and filters aimed to mitigate spamming. These are different attempts; each one has to fight spam from different places and perspectives. For instance, list filters (i.e. the white, black, and gray filters) [6] concern more with the trustable sender's address that is usually placed at the top of the DNS server (i.e. as in the DNSBL applications). Filters are also placed on the Mail Delivery Agent (MDA). But these filters usually are signatures or content-based signatures that require a constant updates to keep it up to date with the most recent spam. Black list is considered as the opposite of the white list. This list filter contains the sender's IP that has already been discovered before and marked as a spammer. The spammer is kept in the black list. The Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) uses this technique; which is the first mail server that sends e-mails by using SMTP connection.
One of the well-known techniques that are being used is the DNSBL and it is used by the Mail Abuse Prevention [5] . Basically, it is a real-time database that contains IPs of all the discovered spams such as bots and Trojans. The DNSBL is built at the high level of the DNS server, which is the largest distributed database that contains IPs, and records of names for each domain. The record that points to the mail service is the Mail Exchanger (MX). The mail server checks for MX record that belongs to the receiver's e-mails. However, if the sender's IP is already listed in the black list, the server will reject the connection and aborts from providing the MTA with the MX record.
Signature-based Spam Detection is a widely used in many mail server systems and it depends on some statistical methods to produce hash value, which is attached with each e-mail to become a marker or signature that classifies the e-mail. By making a comparison with the spam e-mails discovered earlier, the received e-mail is recognized and marked as a spam. Then, this e-mail hash value is stored and distributed to all the filters that use signature technique. It is difficult to calculate the hash value because it depends on specific structures and words that e-mails contain, such as (porn materials, Click Here, Join Us) which give a suspicious value to the e-mail weight. Hash technique or signature gives accepted prevention an improbable percentage to classify legitimate e-mails as spam because it depends on the calculated hash value of the e-mails that are reported as spam.
The methods proposed by [7] Behavior based spam detection provides more ability for discovering spam in general as well as the zero-day spam. Previously, all other methods could not detect the zeroday spams. This is because they depend on the imported pre-data in their detection system, i.e. lists-based and signature-based systems.
A group of researchers [8] studied extracting and shaping the spam on the network-level traffic by using several attributes extracted from the network level. The researchers conducted an experiment on different kinds of e-mail attributes. The information available on the header of the e-mail is used to check for any suspicious element and to identify a spam from a non-spam on the network traffic. Several behaviors can differentiate the spam emails in the packets stream, such as the e-mail arrival process, e-mail size, number of recipients per e-mail, and by analyzing e-mail senders and recipients. All attributes are used to provide the traffic analysis to distinguish between the traffic generated by spams and the legitimate non-spam traffic.
In their proposed solution [9] stated that spamming behaviours are detected on a specific network by using two attributes. First, the probability of the compromised computer is calculated by monitoring the DNS query. After some specific observations, Jian et al's system provides the first probability value. If the probability of the monitored computer is P (h)>0.95, it is considered as a compromised computer because it has a high probability from several observations of the abnormal behaviours on this computer. This is not the final decision. After this stage of analysis on the network layer, the authors went one step further by collecting information from the session layer where the data is more meaningful and useful. They used the Security Detecting System (SDS) placed at the ISP (Internet Service Provider).
From another perspective, in behaviour detection, which is an idea proposed by [10] , they started their proposed work by finding similarity between their proposal and the way filters work. A comparison has been carried out between the bad traffic (which is referred to the network infected with some malware traffic) and the current tested network. It is assumed that there are computers on the network that are working in a legitimate manner and permitted by the ISP to use the mail servers, both local and commercial.
Usually the process of sending e-mails is made by https interface. Sending e-mails by using direct SMTP connection through local SMTP server or any open relay servers to distinguish between legitimate SMTP connections is not easy and needs more monitoring and observation.
Filtering discards the http connection from the mail server because http connection usually requires authentication. The http connection does not meet the spamming criteria as the spam uses un-authenticated mail server to connect with the speed of multiple connections and send e-mails in huge numbers. Research shows that 80% of the e-mails sent are spam [10] .
The number of connections established between a computer in a network and the e-mail server (SMTP server). The normal behavior [10] proposed according to the traffic characters that they depended on. According to this proposed traffic or SMTP connection of the legitimate user, the huge disparity of the number of SMTP connections that a computer connects to e-mail servers gives an alert of abnormal behavior. This computer behavior triggers suspicion that this computer is spamming. These differentiations and characterizations are used to identify the computer that is responsible for spamming [10] .
BEHAVIORAL-BASED SPAMMING DETECTOR (BSD)

Introduction
The proposed framework of this research is behaviourbased. The abnormal behaviours considered in this research will be discussed in this paper. Information extracted from the network-level traffic has several advantages, Network-level information is clear and closer to the spam source than e-mails header and content [11] . One of the advantages of the behaviour-based technique is the ability to detect zero-day spam bots and its potential for early detection. It can be used to detect the spamming attempts before the end of the spam sending session. Hence, recent studies focus on the abnormal behavioural detection. Since spam is an abnormal behaviour, and it uses and consumes the network resources illegally. this abnormal behaviour leaves evidence that point to its occurrence on the network.
BSD Monitoring Abnormal Behaviors
There are several kinds of abnormal behaviours in spam sending or preparation. These kinds of behaviours are observed by monitoring the network that has extra traffic and consumes the resources illegally. There are a number of behaviours used in this research to differentiate between the legitimate traffic and the traffic that caused by the following behaviours:
• Scanning the network: Each network usually has several services such as: file sharing server, printers and mail servers. To know the available services in a particular host, legitimate users pre-configure their machines to deal with these services. However, network intruders such as spambots, spammer and malware use scanning techniques to discover the available service in the network. Scanning services are considered as malicious kinds of behaviour. Scanning for SMTP service is suspicious because the scanner might be a spambot which searches for an open SMTP service in the network.
• Open SMTP server relay: it is a mail server that accepts e-mails blindly without checking any attribute such as the existence of domains and matching sender's IP. This kind of mail server is considered as an open relay [12] . Internet Service Provider (ISP) usually blocks the SMTP port 25 to prevent users or the infected machines from making their own local SMTP service without permission from the ISP. Unauthorized mail servers can be detected by monitoring the SMTP connection that can be made between the mail transfer agent (MTA) and mail delivery agent (MDA) on port 25. If MTA server is not listed as an authorized mail server at the ISP, then it is considered as an open relay.
• Disregarding the Mail Server Priority: A legitimate user sends an MX query to the domain name server asking for the e-mail server's address for this particular domain name in order to send e-mails through. Each mail server in any network has a number representing its priority. This number is attached to the query request reply which leads the requester to the high priority mail server. A machine that disregards the high priority and connects with a low priority mail server is considered as having an abnormal behaviour that can lead to spamming on the network. The blind scanning technique used by bots to detect the SMTP server cannot show whether the mail server is of high priority. This information can be obtained from the MX DNS query.
• Connecting to Multiple Mail Servers: Spambot has the ability to distribute its spam lists to several mail servers. This technique is used to avoid being considered as an abused mail server by sending a huge amount of e-mails.
• Rapid Abnormal Activates: Spam bots have the ability of sending e-mails rapidly and sometimes the period between e-mail sessions is in seconds; to send as much as it can. This is considered as abnormal behaviour.
Similarities Between Botnets Members
A Botnet works as a group and each group has an activity to do or a specialist in a type of attack [13] . The detected hosts that are stated in the behaviours table and their relationships could trigger suspicion that they are members of a Botnet spam group. After obtaining each host and its values (behaviour), it is checked if there is a group of hosts that has the same activity and its behaviour is related to each other. The Coefficient statically formula used in this research is Gower's Coefficient similarity.
Gower's Coefficient
The statistical formula used in this paper is called "Gower's General Similarity" -it is used to measure the relationship and similarity between two rows in a database. Gower gives a similarity rate between 1 and 0 [14] . Gower coefficient [15] is defined as follows.
… (1)
Where N represents a number of variables that represents the detected abnormal behaviours, (xi-xj) represents the absolute difference between the host i and j in behaviour k. Rk is the range between the maximum and minimum value in behaviour k. A different coefficient formula is used to measure the host behavior, but in this case, Gower shows high accuracy in detecting the similarity between hosts behaviour matrices. The Gower's Coefficient also has the ability to measure and show the proximity of mixed data types.
Behavioral-Based SPAMMING Detector (BSD) Framework
The proposed system as shown in Figure 1 below is divided into four main stages; preparing the system's settings, capturing, analysis, and results. At the first stage, the system is prepared by configuring and adding the required variables. At the second stage, the packets are captured and filtered. Then, the third stage is decoding and classifying the packets and inserting the required traffic into the database.
After that the timer (T) equalizes the observation period (Op). The next process is to analyse and extract the useful information from the captured packets that are inserted into the database, and then extracting the abnormal behaviours in the captured traffic. Finally, the relation rate will be calculated to decide whether the detected host behaviours during the observation period can lead to detect a spam bot activities and spamming attempts on the network.
Figure 1. BSD System Framework i. Preparing the System
The proposed framework which is called Behaviouralbased Spamming Detector (BSD) system is preconfigured by the system administrator because it requires knowledge of the network structure and the main services addresses. At this stage, the system should initiate several variables and configurations that BSD system needs to achieve its goals.
The following points summarize all the necessary values and information required to start the system:
• Mail Server MAC and IP addresses.
(1)
• Mail Servers Priority as stated in the MX Query reply • SMTP port used in the SMTP server (default value 25) • Other variables used in the programming application Then, the proposed system proceeds as next stages.
ii. Capturing and Decoding Stage
The packets that traverse the network are captured and filtered. Since the network traffic is a mix of different protocols and packet structures.
The filters are used to reduce the number of the packets to be processed are listed below.
• IP Source and IP Destination within local network IP range. AND • TCP/IP "0x06". AND • Source Port is SMTP port (default 25).
Finally, the packets are inserted into the buffer. The buffer is based on the Queue technique; FIFO (first in first out) to keep the packet in the same order as sniffed. The buffer places all the packets directly in the system, and keeps capturing them without delay.
iii. Decode and Classify Packets
This stage begins when the buffer is not empty; it starts to get packets from the buffer, then decodes and classifies the packets into either SMTP connection packets or service scanning attempts packets. Then, the packets are stored into the system's database to be analyzed and mined later in the next stage. After filtering the packets, they are presented as either established SMTP connection packets, or initiating SMTP connection packets through the TCP three handshakes with the destination SMTP port.
The normal conversion of the machine and mail server to start the SMTP session. It starts by establishing the TCP connection with the three handshakes. Then, the SMTP session either starts to proceed with the mail service request, or it might be rejected by the server. Once the response is checked, it is categorized as a positive reply 220 SMTP message code). Next, it is tested to verify if these packets that contain the 220 message code) come from an authorized mail server such as an open relay on the network. Figure 2 .
Figure 2. How to Extract the SMTP Message Code
The Checking is carried out by comparing the source address with the pre-listed authorized SMTP servers IP's at the Preparing Stage. This test is to discover if there is an open relay SMTP server used illegally to send e-mails directly.
The system stores the information of the discovered open SMTP relays in the database. The proposed system warns the unauthorized open relay used on the network. This is an early alarm because the abnormal behaviour can be discovered directly once it is detected in at least one packet. As such, there is no need to analyse further to discover an open relay mail server. Otherwise, if the source is from the authorized SMTP server, the proposed system only stores the packet in the database.
The stored packets might belong to the service scanning operations. This is determined by monitoring the first packets generated to establish a TCP connection on port 25". The spammer could be a human or machine infected with spam Bot which tries to get the SMTP services because most networks do not allow users to use their own SMTP service, network firewall usually blocks the port 25. That is why the spammers attempt to find a mail server that can be used to send through. The proposed system is only concerned about the (TCP/SYN) to detect the scanning attempts on the network by monitoring the SYN flag TCP packets with destination port 25 and the RST flag TCP packets. These packets are stored in the database to be analyzed later in the next stage.
There are three different destination response cases in SYN-TCP scanning technique. The first case is when the TCP three handshakes are done successfully; and this is the normal case. The second case is when the destination host is turned on, but there is no SMTP services listening on port 25, Figure 3 shows this case. Finally, the third case is when the destination host is turned off or not connected to the network, or the IP is unused, the sent packets are discarded.
The attacker sends several SYN flagged TCP packets to ensure that the packets arrive to the destination host in order to establish a connection, and when there is no SMTP service listening on port 25, the host will automatically reject the request by sending a TCP reply packet with an RST flag set where the RST flagged indicates that the remote host has reset the connection or rejected it. Figure 3 shows the procedure of how the packets are being checked whether it is a part of the scanning technique, or a response to the scanning port. Scanner can run ICMP scanning before SYN-TCP discovers if the host is active and switches on before checking the service.
iv. Identifying The Host's Behaviour
This stage starts once the observation period ends and is determined by the system administrator (tn: is the observer period). Analyzing the packets collected from the previous stage is done at this stage. It involves several tests and analysis procedures to extract and count the total number of occurrence in the network during the experiments of each behaviour stated in Section 3.2.. In the next sections, each test of this case will be discussed in detail and presented in an individual flowchart.
• Scanner detection: This level starts by retrieving all the connections from the database which are TCP RST flagged packets. This phase makes checking for every single MAC that receives RST flagged packets to find out the number of different sources which have been scanned. Then, the detected hosts will be classified into scanning hosts, and added into the database behaviour table.
• Open Relay and Server's Priority Disregarding Detection: this phase detects the open SMTP server and disregards the mail server's priority. This test requires input from all SMTP packets, especially the 220 SMTP code payloaded packet. Initially, the packets are checked if they match the defined mail server's list. This means there is an open relay, hence the source IP's are stored in the behaviours table of the database. Otherwise, if it matches the defined SMTP servers, it is further checked whether the connection is made with the high or low priority servers. All IP's connected with Low Priority SMTP servers are stored in the behaviours table. The system also gathers and indicates the abnormal behaviours.
• Connecting to Multiple SMTP Servers and Rapid SMTP connections: Attackers usually attempt to change everything that could possibly trace them back, or indicate their presence on the ISP hotspot. This is made by changing the mail server. The procedure used in detecting the connection to multiple servers within short period of time. The procedures used in detecting the machines that make multiple connections in seconds.
Finally, when the system passes all the stages, the behaviours table is created by BSD, which contains the behaviours and the hosts. Open relay, scanning network, disregarding mail server priority, connecting to multiple mail servers and rapid connections made are columns in the behaviour table and each row starts with the MAC address of the host.
EXPERIMENTS
Performance Experiment
The experiments are performed on real network environment at the National Advanced IPv6 Centre (NAv6) in Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM). There are several subnets and mail servers, DNS and other servers. Each subnet is connected to a group of switches and to the internet through a router. BSD system collects and captures the traffic that was transmitting in the local subnets and outgoing connections. BSD system is fed with mirror port by giving a copy of each packet transferred in the switch.
Several experiments are performed to collect data (network traffic). These experiments are performed at different times, during the office hours when most of the network hosts are turned ON, connected to the network, and also after office hours. Spam bot simulators have been used to infect a number of hosts on the network. A Spam bot simulator was created for the purpose of the study. Spam bot simulator has several tasks performed in the network; they are listed below.
(i) Scans for open relay SMTP service (ii) Connects to discover mail servers and send emails through (iii) Has the ability of faking e-mail headers, i.e. sends e-mails as it comes from authorized people (iv) Distributes the spam list e-mails to the discovered mail servers (v) Has the ability of sending e-mails fast.
The experiments start by setting up the BSD system and feeding it the with mirror port to capture, this phase it's the observation period. Some computers in the network have been infected with spam bot simulator. After that, the BSD system started to analyze and classify the network traffic to extract the abnormal behavior produced by the infected machines. Each required packet information collected during the experiments is stores into the database to be analyzed in the next phase. A group of behaviors and abnormal hosts are detected during the experiments. The experiment results will be analyzed and explained in detail in the next section.
Experiment Goals
The goals of the experiments are to evaluate the ability to BSD to achieve the research goals as following:
• Ability to detect the group's behaviors that could be a part of spamming activities.
• Capability of detecting the open SMTP relay on the network.
•
Trigger suspicion if there is a group of hosts having a similar behavior that has been detected. These hosts could be Botnet members.
Performance Test Results
The results of the BSD system are stored in a table called Behaviors Table. The results contain the detected machines that are considered as abnormal machines based on their abnormal behavior on the experimented network. The detected hosts are identified with their MAC's address because it is static and is not affected if the host computer changes its IP. Table 1 below shows the detected hosts. The first column is index which identifies the hosts during the results analysis. The values in the last four columns refer to the number of times the abnormal behavior occurred during the experiments. The abnormal behavior has been explained earlier in Section 3.2. The Rows refer to the detected hosts during the experiments. During the experiments, the captured packets (connections) are processed and analyzed.
Table 1. Behavior Table after Analyzing the Captured Traffic
The hosts [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] show the top 10 hosts detected during the experiments where the abnormal behavior reoccurred on the network. There are similar behaviors between these hosts such as ignoring the mail priority and connecting to multiple mail servers during the observation period Tn.
(Tn determined in the preparing phase of the system depend on how long the experiment take). To check whether the hosts [1, 2, 3,4,5,6 and 7] are related, statistics and mathematics are used to calculate the rates of how these hosts are related. The hosts that are related to the abnormal behaviors could be members or "zombies" of the same type of the spam Botnet. Gower 's Coefficient is used in this paper to measure the similarity and to evaluate the detected hosts whether their activities are similar on a network [14] .
Gower coefficient provides flexibility and it works with mixed data types that occur frequently in the databases, it is used for data mining from the databases. All these features meet the research requirements. Gower's general similarity is tested in different data types and it shows high accuracy.
The rows and columns represent the hosts' index [1, 2, 3,4,5,6 and 7] that is stated in Table 1 . The related rate range used is , where 1 shows that the host has full match in its behavior and this is highlighted in blue. 0 shows that it is very different. In this research, it is determined that the rate of 0.5 and above is considered similar, and lesser is dissimilar. The cross cells in the matrix show the related rate between the hosts which are identified by the row and column. The values in blue cells in the matrix refer to the hosts with full match because they are the same hosts. The values in green represent similar hosts with related rate above 0.5. From the table 2 below, the hosts, [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7] appear to have a high rate of matching and similarity, and this gives a suspicious that these hosts may have the same abnormal malicious activity on the network. The top non open Smtp relay host that detected, that are stated in Table 1 above are visualised for better observation and to understand their behaviour and the relationship between the hosts in Figure 4 .
Figure 4. How Hosts Behave on the Network
The Vertical axis in Figure 4 represents the number of times the abnormal behaviour occurs on the network and the horizontal axis represents the behaviours that this framework is based on. Each line in the graph shows a host and these hosts are identified by its Mac address. The hosts [1 -7] are represented graphically in the figure below to reflect how the hosts behave on the network depends on the abnormal behaviour that is stated earlier in Section 3.2. Hosts MAC addresses are arranged as same as in Table 1 from the left to the right.
After using Gower's coefficient that produced proximity matrix showed in Table 1 , the detected host relation became more observable. All related hosts must have a similarity rate above the threshold 0.5 in the Similarity column.
Tables 2 show that the hosts [1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7] are related. BSD system considers these hosts [1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7] as bot members of spam Botnet that exists on the experimented network. Host [3] considered as normal host because it showed it has no relation with the top abnormal behaving hosts in network.
The hosts [8, 9 and 10] are open relay SMTP servers detected on the experiment network and being used as open relay for spam activities. The system considers these hosts as spam sources on the network whenever it detects the open relay attributes.
Goals Achieved by the Experiment
• Table 1 shows the abnormal hosts that perform some activities that are considered as abnormal hosts. They could be infected with some malicious software.
• BSD system detects the host that was scanning on the network for open SMTP service ports.
• The groups that were detected performed similar activities on the network where the latter triggered suspicion that they are related to some type of Botnet for spam purposes. Figure 4 shows how similar the behaviors are. The human decision could be the final judgment to avoid false positives.
EVALUATIONS
The system's evaluation depends on its performance and accuracy in detecting the abnormal hosts and their relationships. Several factors used to evaluate the BSD system such as the detection rate, and false positive and negative rates.
Detection Rate Evaluation
Detection Rate it can be calculated by dividing the true positive hosts detected which are considered as abnormal hosts by summing up the true positive and false positive [13] .
The ideal goal would be to achieve a 100% detection rate, and 0% false positive and negative rate.
False Negative Evaluation
False negative is the number of non-spam bot hosts that are considered as spam bot members divided by the total detected hosts. False negative rate shows the percentage of normal hosts flagged as spam bots. There are false positive cases found in the system's results. From Table 2 , the system's analyzed results showed that host index 3 is stated as a non-spam bot. Table 3 shows how host (3) behaves in the network. Host (3) is absolutely clean from any suspicious behavior, such as open relay, disregarding mail server priority and scanning the network for SMTP services, but it has a high accurate amount in the establishing SMTP connection with multiple mail servers in parallel with different mail servers and sends e-mails through. This high amount of accuracy in these important abnormal behaviors the reason why is listed in the ten abnormal host behaviors in the network. The connections that host (3) made during the experiments periods are analyzed, it shows that host (3) has connected to multiple friendly open relay mail server's proxies for a long period; it can be noticed from the huge number of rapid connections that is (68) and the number of connections made with open relay mail servers to send e-mails through. Because the mail server is already known by the spam bot or spammer, there is no need to do any scanning or disregarding the mail server's priority.
False Positive Evaluation
False Positive it represents the number of spam bots considered as not related to the Botnet spam member. Another weakness of this system which was found during the experiment is the false positive.
Formula 3 calculates the false positive rate [13] . Table 4 below shows host index (6) and its behavior in the network, host (6) shows that it is not an open relay in the network, there was no established connection detected directly with host (6) . This host has a few occurrences in the abnormal behaviors, such as disregarding the mail server priority, connecting to multi mail servers in a short period of time. There are only two cases of rapid connections established by the host. The high amount of accuracy is on the scanning network that is recorded 14 different hosts in the local network which has been scanned by Host (6). Host index 6 states that it is related to the other spam bots detected by the BSD system. After reviewing (Host 6) traffic during the experiment, it was found that the activity performed by the host was scanning the experiment network (14) . The scanning method used was TCP-SYN scans. The experiment network structure contains two open relay mail servers; (*.*.160.124) and (*.*.160.125), which explains why there are two cases of rapid reconnections.
Disregarding priority case occurred because one of the discovered mail servers has low priority (*.*.160.224).
… (3)
Finally, in order to calculate the detection rate, formula 2 is used:
The detection rate obtained is 83.3%. In all experiments that have been done, 6 hosts were detected as spam bots in which one was false positive host; and one false negative case s. This detection rate is based on the performed experiments.
CONCLUSION
The Botnet has the ability and flexibility to be changeable to avoid being detected by any signature or list filters spam detection techniques. New Botnet spamming techniques have motivated researchers to change their spam prevention techniques as well. Many studies have been focusing on how the spammers/spam bots behave on the network. A behavior-based technique is new and so far it has proved that it is more effective in detecting spams, especially the zero-day spam.
This proposed framework is a behavior-based technique which has advantages that do not exist in other detection techniques, such as the signature-based and lists-based ones that have been discussed in Section 2. The ability to detect the spamming attempts in the source side saves time in avoiding these spams by detecting them with their sources. Protecting the network and email system resource from consuming by the unwanted activities at earlier stages is among the advantages that are not available in other techniques that allow the spam to reach the destination mail server and only then detect or block the detected spam. Not all spams can be detected by using the signature, and list filters based techniques but only the e-mails reported as spam. Behavior-based technique has the ability to detect the un-known spams and spam bots by detecting the activities of spam bot on the network. Nowadays, Botnet activity and behaviour have become smarter and have the ability to be changeable and fixable by generating different spam patterns and signatures.
The proposed framework depends in this system on the behaviors-based techniques. The behavioral-based Spamming Detector (BSD) system focuses on multiple behaviors on the network which are considered as spam related activity. The BSD system monitors the networklevel traffic where its information is constant and closer to the sources. Network traffic information is more trustable than the information extracted from the e-mail header at the application layer. BSD system is implemented by using java in the java RCP-eclipse environment. The experiments were performed on the system and the results showed that the system has detected 7 hosts on the experiment network, where 5 of the detected hosts were infected with the simulator spam bot. Two false cases were realized in the results, both false positive and negative. The false rate in the experiment was 16.7% and the detection rate was 83.3%. Overall, this detection rate is accepted and it achieves the research objectives. The 83.3% spam detection obtained by the proposed framework that depends on the behavioral and network traffic.
FUTURE WORK
The proposed framework, (BSD) system has some drawbacks that need to be addressed in the future system development, namely BSD cannot detect in real-time. However, real time functionality is required to detect spamming attempts at early stages. The problem of network resource consumption is still unsolved using the previous techniques because of the loss of the bandwidth caused by the flow of email packets from the source until the e-mails reach their destination. It is planned to improve BSD by enabling real-time detection. Moreover, in future, the system will be built to increase the accuracy and detection rate to enhance the reliability of BSD.
